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REVIEW ESSAY 
 
WHAT NGO ACCOUNTABILITY MEANS—AND DOES NOT MEAN 
 
NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles & Innovations. Edited by Lisa Jordan and Peter 
van Tuijl. London, Sterling VA: Earthscan, 2006. Pp. xii, 257. Index. $120, cloth; 
$37.95, paper. 
 
Before turning to review the book at hand, NGO Accountability, I want to begin 
by briefly setting the stage as to why accountability of NGOs has become significant 
during the past decade. In a story made famous by controversy in the world of 
international NGOs, journalist Sebastian Mallaby wondered back in 2003 about apparent 
local NGO opposition, then being loudly touted by International Rivers Network (IRN), 
an international campaigning NGO based out of Berkeley, California, to a World Bank–
funded dam building project at Bujagali Falls, Uganda.1 He traveled to see the local NGO 
in Uganda. The director of the local organization showed Mallaby its registry of what 
turned out to be a total of just twenty-five local members. Potential beneficiaries of 
electrification from the dam project, however, numbered in the millions, and displaced 
local villagers told him that they believed they had received adequate buyouts. Yet IRN 
involvement meant the death of the project. Afterward, the question became whether the 
result was the triumph of global environmentalism on behalf of otherwise unheard local 
people or the triumph of the priorities of Berkeley, California over the electrification 
needs of millions of poor Africans. Published in a hotly debated article in Foreign 
Policy,2 Mallaby’s account, in the wake of strong responses from IRN and many other 
NGOs (that believed their credibility was also at issue), became a flashpoint in the 
gradually developing debate over international NGOs and their accountability.3 
                                                 
1 SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD’S BANKER: A STORY OF FAILED STATES, FINANCIAL 
CRISES, AND THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (2004).  
2 Sebastian Mallaby, NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor, FOREIGN POLICY, 
Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 50. For a response by IRN, see Peter Brosshard, International Rivers 
Responds to Sebastian Mallaby’s Attacks on NGOs (Nov. 5, 2004), at 
<http://internationalrivers.org/en/africa/bujagali-dam-uganda/international-rivers-
response-sebastian-mallabys-attacks-ngos>; see also Jim MacNeill, Correspondence to 
the Editor of Foreign Policy (Oct. 1, 2004), at 
<http://internationalrivers.org/en/africa/bujagali-dam-uganda/jim-macneils-response-
mallabys-ngos-fighting-poverty-hurting-poor>. For an example of response by another 
NGO, the Institute for Sustainable Development, see Letter from Mark Halle, European 
Representative, International Institute for Sustainable Development, to the Editor of 
FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 28, 2004), at <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade_fp_letter.pdf>. 
3 In chapter 13 of NGO Accountability, former IRN executive director Juliette Majot 
reviews Mallaby’s critique and offers a broader defense of the role of international 
advocacy organizations based around the view that international advocacy organizations 
can give voice to otherwise voiceless local people (pp. 226–27). In light of arguments 
over the substance of Mallaby’s position that took place in 2004, Majot’s argument is 
surprisingly cautious: it essentially limits itself to claiming that international advocacy 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373487
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This intraglobal-bourgeois-elite (as we might call it) spat over Mallaby’s report 
was a late-breaking incident in a larger controversy over NGO influence, accountability, 
and “representativeness” that had been gradually building since the mid-1990s. The end 
of the Cold War saw the “rise and rise” 4 of international and transnational NGOs in 
fields and issues ranging from human rights to the environment to gender issues to 
development to many more—the precise litany of issues, in other words, that seized the 
political imaginations and consciences of the affluent West in the 1990s. These 
international and transnational NGOs had watched the spectacular success of the 
international landmines ban campaign in that decade, in which a broad coalition of NGOs 
united—or, much more precisely, networked—around the world, together with a group of 
like-minded governments led by Canada. The result was a comprehensive landmines ban 
treaty, wide formal adherence to the treaty by states, and a sizable real-world reduction in 
production and use of anti-personnel landmines. Joint receipt of the 1997 Nobel Peace 
Prize by the NGO coalition, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and its 
coordinator Jody Williams, signaled to international and transnational NGOs everywhere 
that new internet technologies, changes in the international political system, and 
acceptance by at least some key governments and international organizations of the 
legitimacy of NGOs meant a new era of their power, influence, and authority in a world 
rapidly integrating economically and politically. 
 
The landmines ban campaign led not only to the elaboration of new organizing 
and campaigning techniques by NGOs but also to a heady new theoretical framework for 
conceiving of them and their place in the world—international and transnational NGOs as 
“global civil society.” In the hands of such political theorists as John Keane, global civil 
society was considered as the international equivalent of the myriad social movements 
and civil society organizations of successful domestic national societies. Civil society, 
long understood as crucial to the success of domestic democratic society, was now to be 
writ large upon the transnational stage.5 An influential book edited by Canadian activists 
in- and outside of the official Canadian foreign ministry argued that global civil society 
meant the democratization of international politics, institutions, and the international 
community through global NGOs, transnational NGO networks, and transnational social 
movements; the landmines campaign showed the way.6 Academic sociologists Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argued that transnational advocacy networks could play 
important roles in transforming certain issues in international politics.7  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
NGOs simply provide an international platform for local organizations and civil society 
(id.). 
4 I borrow this phrase from KIRSTEN SELLARS, THE RISE AND RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2002). 
5 JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? 1–4 (2003). 
6 TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES 424–44 
(Maxwell A. Cameron et al. eds., 1998). 
7 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 25–38 (1998). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373487
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Influential international publications such as The Economist embraced the 
morality of the landmines ban as well as the global civil society theory underlying the 
ban campaign—arguing from a stance of high-minded, enlightened global business 
interests that global civil society could serve to humanize economic globalization. The 
World Bank under James Wolfensohn embraced the spirit of the age, as it were, making 
consultation and, where possible, the blessing of NGOs as close to bank policy as he 
could get.8 The NGOs were no longer left outside the building or cooling their heels in 
the corridors of power, but became a presence inside the negotiating rooms of treaties, 
international agreements, contracts, and development projects large and small. NGOs 
were now an accepted player in nascent global governance. Yet the theory that 
transformed them from mere NGOs into “global civil society” presumed important things 
not only about the nature of NGOs but also about that supposedly emerging “global 
governance.”  
 
Perhaps the high-water mark of claims for global civil society, its legitimacy in 
international affairs, and its supposed ability to do that which governments supposedly 
could not, came in a December 1999 speech by then-Secretary General Kofi Annan to the 
World Civil Society Conference, informing representatives of global civil society that 
“global people power” was the “best thing for [the] United Nations” in a “long time.”9 
Later, at the UN NGO Millennium Forum in 2000, he told NGO representatives that not 
only do “you bring to life the concept of ‘We, the Peoples,’ in whose name our United 
Nations Charter was written; you bring to us the promise that ‘people power’ can make 
the Charter work for all the world’s peoples in the twenty-first century.”10 It is a 
formulation that today, after all the criticism and (let us be frank) subsequent 
backpedaling,11 must seem quite remarkable. It would indeed be hard to come up with a 
more ringing endorsement of the claim of international and transnational NGOs, at least 
with respect to international organizations, to be representatives of the peoples of the 
world.  
 
Simultaneous with that high-water moment, however, anti-globalization rioters 
managed to break up and shut down the December 1999 Seattle meetings of the World 
                                                 
8 According to The Economist, then–World Bank president Wolfensohn made “dialogue 
with NGOs a central component of the institution’s work. . . . More than half of World 
Bank projects [in 1998] involved NGOs. . . . From environmental policy to debt relief, 
NGOs are at the center of World Bank policy.” Special: Citizens’ Groups: The Non-
governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratize, or Merely Disrupt, Global Governance?, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at 20, 21. 
9 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Address at World Civil Society 
Conference (Dec. 8, 1999) at M2 Presswire, Dec. 9, 1999 (“Secretary-General says 
‘global people power’ best thing for United Nations in long time.”). 
10 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Address at Millennium Forum (May 
22, 2000), at M2 Presswire, May 23, 2000 (calling for an intensified “NGO revolution”). 
11 See infra text at notes12–21.  
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Trade Organization.12 The ideological challenge came not just from violent protestors in 
the streets, but from a wide array of NGOs who had been invited to participate in the 
official process and, not coincidentally, grant it legitimacy and a sort of Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Global Civil Society Approval. In that moment in Seattle, the 
legitimacy and goodwill of the transnational NGOs became a large question mark for an 
increasing number of critics and one-time supporters.13  
 
It was one thing when the issue was landmines: no one, not even the United 
States, was really willing to defend them except on such grounds as dire military 
necessity.14 Trade, however, was understood as an entirely different matter. For many, 
including the World Trade Organization itself, trade was an unalloyed social good for 
everyone, rich and poor but especially poor.15 And even if it were not a wholly 
uncontested or uncontestable social good, free trade—unlike a morally indefensible 
weapon like landmines—seemingly had to be considered as a matter of complex 
economic and social tradeoffs, decisions about which had to be made by those who 
represented whole populations.16  
 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard is Called to 
Quell Trade-Talk Protests; Seattle is Under Curfew After Disruptions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
1, 1999, at A1; Helene Cooper, Seattle Showdown: Third World Pragmatism Spars With 
American Ideals, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Dec. 3, 1999, at A1. 
13 See, e.g., Barun S. Mitra, WTO Protesters vs. the Poor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at 
A26. My own experience in those days suggests too that the refusal of many of the 
“respectable” seat-at-the-table NGOs inside the discussions in Seattle to condemn the 
violence instigated by anti-globalization protesters or even very much to distance 
themselves from it contributed considerably to a sense among governments that the 
governments had quite possibly made a strategic mistake. 
14 See Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United States Military Lawyer in Projecting a 
Vision of the Laws of War, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 445, 448–53 (Fall 2003). 
15 See, e.g., Dan Ben-David, Håkan Nordström & L. Alan Winters, Trade, Income 
Disparity and Poverty (June 19, 2000) (study sponsored by WTO Secretariat) at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pov1_e.pdf>; Press Release, WTO, Free 
Trade Helps Reduce Poverty, Says New WTO Secretariat Study (June 13, 2000).  
16 This assessment was approximately Kofi Annan’s position. To his considerable credit, 
and regardless of one’s view of the substantive issue, Annan had the courage to confront 
the NGOs directly in the Millennium Summit a few months after the Seattle debacle and 
state flatly that the “overarching challenge of our times is to make globalization mean 
more than bigger markets. . . . [W]hile globalization has produced winners and losers, the 
solution is not confrontation. It is not to make winners of the losers and losers of the 
winners. It is to ensure that nobody sinks, but that we swim together with the current of 
our times.” Kofi Annan, Address to the Millennium Forum (May 22, 2000) at 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000522.sgsm7411.doc.html>; see Kenneth 
Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of Globalizing 
Markets,” 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 112–14 (2002). 
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During the last decade, views concerning NGO representativeness have shifted. 
Global civil society loudly proclaimed through the 1990s, on the strength of the moral 
crusade of the landmines campaign, that the representatives of the world’s peoples to 
international organizations and states were to be global civil society. By 2000, not 
everyone was so sure: increasing numbers of skeptics thought, even in the case of less 
than democratic states in the poor world, that decisions about economic tradeoffs for 
populations concerning trade should be made by governments or, at any rate, someone 
other than self-appointed advocacy groups.17 By mid-2000, Fareed Zakaria, managing 
editor of Foreign Affairs, remarked in an interview with The Spectator that, with respect 
to the Seattle collapse, “my concern is that governments will listen too much to the loud 
[NGO] minority and neglect the fears of the silent majority” with the effect of devolving 
power to “interested, unelected, unrepresentative and unaccountable NGOs.”18 The 
Economist, in an alarmed about-face following Seattle, opined that the “general public 
tends to see [NGOs] as uniformly altruistic, idealistic and independent. But the term 
‘NGO,’ like the activities of the NGOs themselves, deserves much sharper scrutiny. . . . 
They are rarely obliged to think about trade-offs in policy.” 19 It added, for good measure, 
that NGOs “are not accountable to anyone.”20 And as David Rieff put it rather more 
sharply, “So who elected the NGOs?”21 
 
That carries matters up through 2000. The book under review, aptly titled NGO 
Accountability, largely takes in the much more chastened, much more bridled discussion 
of the years since and is an attempt squarely aimed to offer some answers to those 
criticisms and those critics.22 Unlike other volumes on the subject and despite the 
sometimes differing views of contributors, the book is mostly targeted to the specific 
questions of what NGO accountability means and does not mean, why it is significant 
and why it is not, and what can be done to achieve what the authors respectively believe 
                                                 
17 One of them being Mallaby. See Sebastian Mallaby, Big Nongovernment, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 30, 1999, at A29. 
18 Justin Marozzi, Whose World Is it, Anyway? SPECTATOR (London), Aug. 5, 2000, at 
14. 
19 NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 25. 
20 Id. 
21 David Rieff, Address at the Conference on the Landmines Campaign and International 
Civil Society, Washington College of Law, American University (Feb. 27, 1998) (panel 
moderated by Kenneth Anderson); see also David Rieff, The False Dawn of Civil 
Society, NATION, Feb. 22, 1999, at 11. 
22 I should disclose that I have played a minor role in the debate as one of the critics of 
the NGOs. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, Global Civil Society: A Skeptical 
View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5 26–38 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2004); 
Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines: The Role of 
International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil 
Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91–120 (2000); Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of 
Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration 
on Relations with International Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371–
88 (2001). 
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is key in the way of accountability in admirably practical terms. Its focus means that I 
expect to consult the work as a whole rather than merely using it as a printed repository 
of just one or two specific articles.  
 
Chapters are organized in four sections: 1) the current NGO accountability debate 
as fundamental questions and concepts; 2) traditional responses through law, best 
practices, and donor regimes; 3) consideration of accountability in the context of 
particular country settings; and 4) forward-looking approaches to NGO accountability. 
Some chapters in each section focus on individual country settings; the ability to compare 
Jassy Kwesiga and Harriest Namisi’s chapter on Uganda’s “first generation” NGO law 
with Sarah Okwaare and Jennifer Chapman’s chapter on newer, forward-looking NGO 
accountability practices in Uganda is particularly useful. Other chapters focus on 
countries’ different accountability mechanisms regarding transnational NGOs that work 
within their respective borders. The authors and editors have done a good job using 
country case studies, such as Hans Antolov, Rustam Ibrahim, and Peter van Tuijl’s 
chapter on NGO governance in Indonesia, to offer lessons beyond their geographical 
settings. Much of the notion of accountability driving the book chapters is about NGO 
accountability within a particular society. Still others, such as Hetty Kovach’s 
contribution to innovations in accountability, look to the global setting for international 
and transnational NGOs and to the relationship of NGO accountability to global 
governance.  
 
Accountability of international and transnational NGOs continues to have 
political salience not merely because NGOs are often single-interest advocacy groups—
Zakaria’s “loud minority”—or because they are located in Berkeley but opine loudly and 
influentially about rural Uganda or because not even NGOs are somehow magically 
immune from personal corruption leading to the diversion of charitable assets or 
institutional rent-seeking behavior or any of the other concerns that corporate governance 
as a general apolitical matter seeks to check in all spheres of legally chartered 
organizations. It would be pleasant if issues of accountability could be confined to a 
society and its own NGOs or to the NGOs that come there from abroad, or if 
accountability could be limited to apolitical issues of corporate governance. Large and 
important questions arise in these areas, which much of this book takes on with great 
acuity. But I persist in pressing the questions of accountability—taken up by a minority 
of the articles in the volume—that exist, not because of corruption or poor management, 
but because of the very conception of global governance implicit in the concept of NGOs 
as global civil society. The book exhibits a curious schizophrenia on this issue—one I 
fully share—in wanting on the one hand to leave aside questions of representativeness 
and discuss other matters of accountability while somehow not being able to leave the 
question of representation aside at all. The issue is not resolved by a tacit agreement not 
to discuss the issue: we will be vexed by the return of the repressed. 
 
NGO accountability became a central issue in large part after all because it was 
linked to the question of whether and to what extent NGOs should be seen as 
“representative” of the world’s peoples—as one half, in other words, of an equation about 
global governance. But what, then, is the other half? It will turn out to be international 
 7 
organizations in general and the United Nations in particular. The accountability issue 
became more than simply apolitical corporate governance because NGOs in the 1990s 
took the mantle of representativeness in this equation of global governance upon 
themselves, and because international organizations such as the United Nations embraced 
them as a source of legitimacy through “representativeness” that bypassed the 
increasingly problematic legitimacy of international organizations through nation-states. 
The Ford Foundation’s Michael Edwards, in his short forward to the book, denies this 
dynamic, but that was simply not my experience as the Human Rights Watch Arms 
Division director and later as general counsel to a leading international donor, the Open 
Society Institute. 23 From the very beginning, I was deeply involved in the landmines ban 
campaign, and, based on that experience, I do not know how one could otherwise 
interpret the triumphalist speeches by NGOs during the period,24 the lengthy theorizing of 
precisely such by political and social theorists such as John Keane or David Held,25 the 
strategic reconceptualizing of NGOs and social movements as “global civil society” by 
                                                 
23 One can accept that a useful debate exists today on “costs and benefits of different 
approaches to accountability” without accepting the quite remarkable contention of 
Edwards that “no NGO, to my knowledge, has subscribed to” the claim that they 
“compete with governments as representatives of the electorate” (p. ix). We seem to have 
lived through two quite different NGO worlds in the 1990s. I can recall conversations to 
that effect with program officers and senior executives of the Ford Foundation, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the MacArthur Foundation, and 
various others, just on the donor side of the global NGO world. Add to that the euphoria 
that permeated the NGOs as well as a substantial part of the international organization 
community, the UN and its agencies, which saw the NGOs as an avenue for a legitimacy 
“end run,” as it were, around the member-states that they saw, correctly, as hampering 
their freedom of action. Why should this be any surprise? The claim of being the 
legitimate representatives of the peoples of the world before international organizations 
was endorsed, after all, by Kofi Annan and the Secretariat, and it was a featured part of 
the appeal for funding to the donor foundations. To get funding, NGOs not only told all 
about the specific good things that they would do with the money; they also inserted a 
narrative about the more general effect of representing the world’s peoples. In my 
experience, donor organizations loved this kind of appeal because it raised their grant-
making above the grubby level of helping specific people with specific things and gave it 
a patina of permanently reshaping “our global community.” I personally raised a 
substantial amount of money on precisely this claim, and I was far from alone, however 
embarrassing or overwrought the whole pitch might seem a dozen years later. 
24 Approving examples can be found in, for example, ALISON VAN ROOY, THE GLOBAL 
LEGITIMACY GAME: CIVIL SOCIETY, GLOBALIZATION, AND PROTEST 33 (2004). 
25 Among Held’s voluminous writings in this area, see, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (1999); DAVID HELD, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN 
GOVERNANCE (1995). Held is noteworthy for working out the theory of precisely what 
Edwards denies—the argument that NGOs can serve as an alternative source of 
democratic, representative, and participatory legitimacy for international organizations 
reaching to global governance. 
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activist-intellectuals as Alison van Rooy,26 or the fawning upon “global civil society” by 
Kofi Annan, Mark Malloch Brown, Louise Fréchette, and so many other international 
organization officials as they saw the advantages of NGOs as a source of legitimacy.27 
The issue of accountability in relation to a particular conception of global governance 
does not suddenly go away simply because corporate governance officers at leading 
donor agencies decide that accountability is instead about relations with local 
governments rather than with international organizations. Accountability, Edwards says, 
is “the price to be paid . . . for the freedom to exercise power and authority in a 
democratic society” (p. ix). This statement is stunning both for its hubris and for its 
complete elision of the two central issues: that accountability matters whether or not one 
exercises such power and authority and that accountability is not a sufficient ground on 
which to exercise power and authority in a democratic society.  
 
Rather than denying that the 1990s involved much rhetorical and theoretical 
excess on the issue of NGO “representativeness,” wiser counsel is that adopted by many 
organizations following 2000 and discussed in the book. Enrique Peruzzotti has written 
an exceptionally thoughtful chapter on civil society and representation, which 
straightforwardly accepts criticism of legitimacy inflation in the 1990s and moves on. 
The task, which Peruzzotti admirably undertakes, is conceptually to separate the matter of 
representation from accountability. This chapter forms, along with Steve Charnovitz’s 
chapter on NGOs and global governance (and his writings on related topics in AJIL28), 
the best current restatement of the conceptual issues of which I am aware. In that regard, 
accountability is a matter that only partly overlaps with the concerns of representation. 
Representation and democratic participation—seen from the viewpoint of organizational 
accountability—are mechanisms by which an organization can be made accountable for 
itself and its actions—provided that meaningful ways exist for those being represented to 
exercise participation in and, ultimately, control over the organization. But that is rarely 
the case with NGOs. If the claim, after all, is to represent the peoples of the world, it 
seems vanishingly small that the peoples of the world will be able to exercise meaningful 
control or even express themselves with respect to the method and content of that 
representation. This is no less true, of course, in many other governance settings that 
make far more modest claims about representation—ordinary corporate governance, for 
example—and so we look for public accountability in most instances in different ways. 
Fiduciary obligation enforced by courts, legal rules regarding utilization of resources in 
                                                 
26 VAN ROOY, supra note 24, at 127–61. 
27 A recurrent minor theme throughout one account of the United Nations under Kofi 
Annan is the argument between those characterized by political scientist and UN official 
John Ruggie as, within the United Nations, the “traditionalists” who favor a member-state 
orientation for the organization and the “modernizers” who favor seeking to bypass 
member-states to the extent possible, in part by building links directly to global and 
cosmopolitan constituencies, of which transnational NGOs are a core part. JAMES TRAUB, 
THE BEST INTENTIONS: KOFI ANNAN AND THE UN IN THE ERA OF AMERICAN WORLD 
POWER 383 (2006).  
28 See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 
AJIL 348 (2006). 
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charitable public trust, and so on are mechanisms of accountability that have frankly little 
to do with democracy or representation in any specific, concrete sense, but instead rely on 
bureaucratic or legal structures in the fashion of a financial regulator, auditors, and courts 
of law. Accountability only partly overlaps with representativeness, and accountability is 
very frequently best obtained through mechanisms that are not fundamentally about 
representation or democracy except in the most abstract sense of the rule of law. 
 
Democracy and representative legitimacy are, however, values in and of 
themselves, quite apart from their potential to establish accountability. In that regard, to 
ask about accountability is really to ask whether NGOs are representative of those they 
claim (or once claimed) to represent and whether they merit the legitimacy that they 
claim such representativeness confers. In this sense, to ask about accountability is not 
merely to ask whether NGOs “responsibly” exercise their power but instead whether a 
basis exists for them to be invested with such power in the first place. Before getting to 
the question of whether NGOs meet the standards of fiduciary duties, we must first ask 
on what basis they claim to be legitimate fiduciaries. And if it is on the basis of 
representing “people” or “peoples” or “the world’s Peoples,” then we should not frame 
the question of accountability as a merely technical question of execution and so presume 
the quite radical conclusion that they have legitimate claim to “represent,” and account 
for the interests and desires and values of all these “people” in the first place. NGOs 
helped themselves to this legitimacy by making otherwise unsubstantiated claims of 
representation; this issue persists for the legitimacy of global governance independently 
of, and prior to, the issue of whether or not NGOs properly execute their fiduciary duties.  
 
Critique of international and transnational NGOs is thus only partly about 
accountability in the fiduciary sense or even the single-issue sense versus social trade-
offs sense. Rather, the critique centers on the NGOs’ assertion of a legitimating role in 
global governance. The implication is that they hold a position—simultaneously adopted 
by NGOs as a means of gaining admission to officialdom and assigned to them by 
international organization bureaucracies in search of legitimacy for themselves29—on that 
                                                 
29 Lest one think this tradeoff as merely theoretical, consider, for example, the support 
given by leading international human rights monitors such as Human Rights Watch for 
the watered down, compromise replacement of the discredited UN Human Rights 
Commission by the Human Rights Council in 2005–06, which required repudiation of 
many core issues on which human rights organizations had insisted. Acceptance of the 
Human Rights Council is really only explainable in my view by a preference, and the 
preferment that comes with it, of these international NGOs for international organizations 
and internationalism as such, even under circumstances where it involves setting aside a 
considerable amount of the organization’s substantive moral agenda to support the 
political legitimacy of an international organization. Not everyone will agree (starting 
presumably with Human Rights Watch, although I wonder if it harbors private doubts), 
but even the New York Times editorial board thought this result was a bad bargain. See, 
e.g., Editorial, The Shame of the United Nations: A Once Promising Reform Proposal for 
the United Nations Human Rights Commission Has Become So Watered Down that It 
Has Become an Ugly Sham, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, § 4, at 11. Not so Human Rights 
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most highly contested of issues, global governance.30 Peruzzotti and Charnovitz, in their 
respective chapters, disentangle these separate issues, accountability from global 
governance. To the extent they offer or critique policy proposals—such as Charnovitz’s 
skepticism that NGO regulation can or should somehow seek to force NGOs away from 
single-interest advocacy—they focus on the issue of accountability rather than 
representation. These authors would seem to either accept the critique of 
representativeness or simply believe it to be overstated: in either case, they thus have 
reasons to focus on narrower and more practical issues of accountability.  
 
My own concern, however, continues nakedly to be that powerful incentives for 
international and transnational NGOs to claim representativeness—as part of a mutually 
reinforcing dynamic in which global civil society offers legitimacy to international 
organizations in a notably undemocratic vision of global governance and takes back 
recognition, access, and legitimacy in their turn—are as present as ever. Charnovitz 
inquires of my own view why lobbying by an NGO to a “group of governments poses 
more risks to democracy than the same lobbying by that NGO to its ‘home’ government” 
(p. 42, n.11). The brief response is that to frame the question this way begins by 
presuming that lobbying a public international organization is the same as lobbying a 
“group of governments”—as though the UN were merely an agglomeration of member-
state governments and not an institution with its own dynamics, interests, politics, and all 
manner of institutional existence beyond the member-states, singly or together. With 
respect to a single (democratic) government, NGO lobbying in the NGO’s domestic 
(democratic) society must contend with an electorate, a ballot box, and the checks upon 
the legitimacy claims of the NGO because it exists within a democratic structure and 
process against which its advocacy can be tested. That perspective is also true when 
NGOs lobby groups of (democratic) governments. Lobbying international organizations, 
however, is not the same as lobbying “groups of governments,” even if the international 
                                                                                                                                                 
Watch. In my estimation, this is an example of a bargain exemplifying an NGO receiving 
access and legitimacy in exchange for granting legitimacy to an intergovernmental 
organization. Pay to play.  
30 I realize that, for some readers of this book or of this review, the question of global 
governance, whether its desirability or its form, is not contested at all. But for others, like 
me, the failure even to regard it as contested is precisely the problem. However, I do not 
address in this review the most striking recent turn of the global governance debate, the 
intellectual move taken today at the forward intellectual margin, so to speak. It is that, 
through constructs of “global government networks” and the growth of global 
administrative governance, technocratically legitimate forms of global governance arise 
in which NGOs are curiously left aside in favor of the technocrats of intergovernmental 
networks. The question of political legitimacy proffered by NGOs, as global civil society, 
is no longer an interesting issue. Neither, for that matter, is the legitimacy of international 
organizations as political organizations as such. “Legitimacy,” in the new administrative-
technocratic model, comes therefore not from any genuinely “political” source at all, but 
is instead simply a by-product of the competent provision of administrative services. 
Legitimacy, in such case, is no longer a matter of representativeness but merely a matter 
of who is able to make the internet run on time.  
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organizations are somehow in principle the servants of their member-states, and the 
differences between these two categories, national government(s) and international 
organizations, and the implied differences of incentives and strategic behavior, are as 
considerable as public choice theory might suggest. NGOs in the international arena do 
not have to contend with the appurtenances of democracy that would confront (and often 
confound) them in a national democratic society. Moreover, for a decade or so 
international NGOs came perilously close, or more, to claiming to be that democratic, or 
at least representative, structure in the international arena. These structural concerns 
about global governance have been relieved to some extent today by outside criticism, 
but the incentives that lead to such claims have not gone away. 
 
My suggestion that representation and democratic debates over NGOs continue 
because the structural incentives have not changed within the argument over global 
governance does not detract, nor should it distract, from this book’s main point. That 
point is to survey and advance the understanding of what can be done to develop 
meaningful accountability in the senses apart from representativeness. Accountability 
that recognizes that one great virtue of NGOs, as Peruzzotti puts it, is precisely that the 
“constituent politics of civil society leave great room for creative and innovative action, 
allowing social movements or NGOs to challenge present identities or existing 
constituencies without being concerned about electoral accountability or due process” (p. 
48). 31 The glory of civil society institutions ought to be that they are not representative, 
and, because they are not, are free to argue and shout their visions of social justice, seek 
to persuade, offer alternatives that representative institutions cannot. They, for their part, 
need to understand that the rest of us are quite free to disagree with their ideas, to 
confound their plans, and to thwart their actions—or merely to ignore them.  
 
But even civil society institutions that make no claim to democratic representation 
still need to be accountable, not only in the auditing, accounting, and fiduciary senses, but 
also in the transparency sense, so that others can judge them and their programs—
transparency that allows outsiders to make their own judgments on many things about 
particular NGO proposals in particular circumstances, including the vexed issue of causes 
in Berkeley and effects in Uganda. Moreover, in societies and circumstances where 
NGOs wield economic power that starts uncomfortably to resemble that of governments 
or business,32 other questions of accountability arise because NGO power goes beyond 
mere suasion. We are therefore in need of precisely the theoretically informed yet 
practically oriented discussion and policy analysis that this well-organized, thoughtful 
volume offers.  
 
                                                 
31 Drawing, as Peruzzotti does in this section (p. 49), I am not unhappy to report, from 
Anderson & Rieff, supra note 22.  
32 Or, for that matter, brigands. I leave aside here the dismaying recent episode of a 
French NGO entrepreneur deciding that humanitarian action meant involuntarily and 
covertly removing Sudanese children for adoption abroad without the consent of their 
parents or relatives. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, An Abduction of Idealism, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at 7. 
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